This Sex Which Is Not One

In “This Sex Which Is Not One” (an essay in the book of the same title), Luce Irigaray critiques the masculine conception of feminine/female sexuality and proposes descriptions that come from a woman. Irigaray explains that within female sexuality, an opposition is set up “between ‘masculine’ clitoral activity and ‘feminine’ vaginal passivity” in which “the

The Lacanian Subject (according to Fink): Further Beyond: Traversing Fantasy

[The psychoanalytic couch; An Associated Press photo by Bob Wands] [Continues "Another Bar"] As a preliminary formulation, Fink sums up the process by which the subject is “alienat[ed] by and in the Other [as language]” and then “separate[d] from the [m]Other [as desire]” through the prohibition of the fOther (as law (i.e. prohibitive/symbolizing/socializing language)) as

either No! or Couldn’t: The Disjunctive Synthesis of Recording

[Rembrandt's Saint Paul in Prison] So, coming straight out of our last conversation (about their playfulness, their promiscuity, i.e. their connectivity), we’re still talking about desiring-machines. (Either) Ryan and I (or, more precisely: /). (Or) Aless and /. S/he asks me (one of them, ‘can’t remember who) (/ suspect after the Dionysian celebration that commenced,

The Virtual, the Actual, and the Intensive

DeLanda explains in Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy that “Deleuze is not a realist about essences, or any other transcendent entity.” Nonetheless, he is a realist. “A non-realist can simply declare essences mental entities, or reduce them to social conventions.” Not Deleuze. Deleuze “does not get rid of essences until [he] replaces them with something else” to “explain what gives objects their identity and what preserves this identity through time.” This something else consists (using the terminology of Difference and Repetition) in the virtual, the actual, and the intensive.